It takes decades to ramp up the infrastructure of a country. The initial years are the most difficult and fraught with risk. The process of planning and putting the approvals framework into place can take years to complete.
In this context, what the Government of Myanmar has achieved in a very short time is as remarkable as it is unique. When it started, several factors that some consider essential for a successful ramp up of a country’s infrastructure were severely underdeveloped. Despite this, the country has taken bold steps in multiple sectors simultaneously. The single biggest factor driving this change is the strong and clear intent of the government to do what is needed to improve infrastructure so that it becomes an enabler of economic growth.
In this regard, we believe the following five steps that the government is in the process of implementing would further help achieve its targets:
Building institutional capacity within the government to prioritize and procure the needed infrastructure which provides “value for money” – experience gained by the energy sector and ongoing know-how being developed by the telecom and transport sectors in procurement methods would serve as templates to procurement teams in other infrastructure sectors;
Actively encouraging the development of partnerships between foreign and local participants to bring together international know-how and local context – the FIL makes joint ventures the preferred mode for several sectors, thereby ensuring that infrastructure providers have local know-how and context. This helps in the development of local enterprises and transfer of technology and managerial capabilities;
Developing the banking system and financial markets to allow free flow of capital to support infrastructure investment – the Central Bank of Myanmar Law, when passed, should address some of the outstanding issues in the sector;
Fostering public goodwill towards infrastructure projects by demonstrating their economic benefits and potential for creating jobs – the requirement for all large projects in the future to be environmentally sound and to have a positive socio-economic impact will help achieve sustainable and inclusive development.
A WALK AROUND battered, ramshackle Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city and former capital, quickly makes it clear how far the country has fallen behind the rest of Asia over the past half-century. In large part the place is but a ghostly reminder of former glories. Under British colonial rule, before independence in 1948, Rangoon (as it was then) was a thriving, cosmopolitan entrepot, the capital of Burma, one of the region’s wealthiest countries. All that came to an abrupt end in 1962 after a junta of army officers, led by the brutal General Ne Win, seized power and launched the country on the quasi-Marxist “Burmese Way to Socialism”. Private foreign-owned businesses were nationalised, prompting the exodus of hundreds of thousands of people, many of Indian origin. The country’s tenuous attachment to democracy was broken. Myanmar, as Burma was later renamed by its ruling generals, retreated into itself. Comprehensive Western sanctions hit home from the mid-1990s onwards, only slightly alleviated by an injection of Asian money.
Yangon, with its old cars and bookshops selling textbooks from the 1950s, attests to this seclusion. The colonial-era banks, law courts and department stores, once as imposing as any in Kolkata or Shanghai, have all but crumbled away. Except for the magnificent Shwedagon Pagoda, lovingly regilded to welcome the crowds of pilgrims and tourists, most of the city seems to have remained untouched for decades. Even youthful rebellion is stuck in a time-warp. Boys are still gamely attempting to flout authority by dressing up as punk-rockers.
But now the country has seen another about-turn, almost as abrupt as that in 1962. Over the past two years dramatic reforms introduced by a new president, Thein Sein, prompted by the country’s increasingly desperate economic straits, have started a rapid transition from secretive isolation to an open democracy of sorts. The mere fact of such a change taking place has surprised the world; its speed and breadth have caused widespread bewilderment.
Even in careworn Yangon the signs are everywhere. The pavements are cluttered with traders selling an array of newspapers, newly licensed and privately owned, carrying pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD). Less than two years ago the image of the defiant Nobel peace-prize laureate was banned; under a strict censorship system her name could not even be mentioned in the press. Now all censorship before publication has been lifted; any paper, such as the NLD’s own newspaperD Wave, can apply to publish daily; and Miss Suu Kyi’s photo festoons T-shirts, mugs and biros for sale on almost every street corner. People are still excited about being able to speak freely, even about politics, without constantly having to look over their shoulders. Some of those interviewed for this special report had never before talked to a foreigner, let alone a foreign journalist.
With greater political freedom has come economic change. Almost all Western sanctions against the country have been lifted, and the country is swiftly reconnecting with the international financial system. Visitors no longer have to wander around with so many wads of dirty old kyat, the local currency, in their pockets: the first international ATM in Yangon has recently started disgorging fresh banknotes. Some outlets are now accepting credit cards. Real Western brands, rather than pirated versions, are about to appear in a few shops. An influx of relatively wealthy foreigners and returned natives will need new offices and apartments. Prime parts of Yangon are rapidly being flattened to cater for the expected demand.
Myanmar’s transformation is the most significant event to have taken place in South-East Asia in the past decade, and this special report will argue that it will have important consequences for the rest of Asia as well. In the space of just a few years almost every aspect of life has been touched by the reform programme. Not only was Miss Suu Kyi released from house arrest in November 2010, but the vast majority of the country’s thousands of political prisoners have been freed. The NLD, harassed for decades and then declared illegal for refusing to participate in rigged elections in 2010, is legitimate once more. In April 2012 it won 43 out of 44 seats it contested in by-elections, the country’s first free and fair polls since the 1950s: its MPs, led by Miss Suu Kyi, now sit in parliament.
From the ruling Communist Party to filmmakers and bloggers, more and more people in China are looking to get their voices heard.
As blogs look to exploit their political potential and grassroots protests and mass incidents continue to increase in numbers, we analyse how the country run and how do the people get their say.
In this episode of China Rising , we look at how the people of one of the world's most powerful, yet closed states, manage to reach the masses.
We interview authors who struggle with censorship and self-censorship, and examine the country's thriving film industry, which seeks to top Hollywood.
Although no other country in history has risen so quickly from poverty to prosperity as China has, for many in the world's most populous nation, those advances have come at a price.
The economic reforms that made the People's Republic's rise possible have also led to a harshly divided China. Divisions whose impacts could easily spread from disenfranchised indviduals to threaten the economic growth contemporary Chinese society has come to be based upon.
In the opening episode of this four-part series, we tell the stories behind these divisions, from the rising urban middle class to impoverished rural areas and the precarious existence of hundreds of millions of migrant workers on the fringes of some of the world's fastest growing cities.
In just 30 years, China has risen from long-standing poverty to being the second largest economy in the world – faster than any other country in history.
From angry farmers to weary migrant workers, powerful politicians and everyone in between, what China says and does, has become of undeniable importance to the entire world.
Part 3 : China - The Asian Century ; The Chinese dream
The title of a book by the late American sinologist Benjamin I Schwartz, “In Search of Wealth and Power", rather accurately sums up the preoccupation of generations of Chinese intellectuals, reformers and revolutionaries in modern times. These men and women, with varying degrees of success, sought to stem the tide of imperialist encroachment on China in its struggle for survival in the modern world, principally by unlocking the secret to “wealth and power". A wealthy and strong China, one that is not in danger of being partitioned by the colonial powers, was their dream, one might say.
Chinese President and Communist Party of China General Secretary Xi Jinping also has a dream, one that he elaborated on in a speech titled “The China Dream, The People’s Dream", which he delivered on 17 March at the Second Plenary Session of the National People’s Congress.“To achieve a comprehensively well-off society, to build a prosperous, strong, democratic, civilised, and harmonious modern socialist country and to attain the Chinese dream of the great renaissance of the Chinese nation is to achieve prosperity, revitalise the nation, and bring about the happiness of the people,” Xi said in the speech.But before that, on 29 November, 2012, two weeks after his appointment as the party’s general secretary and military commander-in-chief, Xi visited the grandiose National Museum next to Tiananmen Square. During the trip, he told reporters and museum workers that the “greatest Chinese dream” was the “great revival of the Chinese nation,” according to a commentary in a recent issue of Britain’s Economist magazine.
The commentary then elaborated on the symbolism of the setting in which Xi first gave voice to his slogan, concluding that the remarks against such a special backdrop made it clear that he was flexing his muscle as a nationalist and as a party believer.In line with what previous generations of Chinese intellectuals, statesmen, and revolutionaries had to say when the survival of their country, often referred to as the “sick man of the East", was at stake, these remarks could be understood as mere rhetoric intended to score points with Chinese at home and abroad. No threat, if any, was intended.But now, with a well-equipped and at least numerically formidable army, more money to purchase the latest military hardware, and being on course to become the world’s largest economy within decades, if not earlier, China under the leadership of Xi could really have dreams that resonate better with those of its people than such a “wealth and power” dream. In other words, Xi should have dreamed up a more ambitious dream than the so-called “American Dream” of middle-class material comfort for his people.Now that the “wealth and power” dream is more or less fulfilled, another dream, also American, is recommended if Xi is to achieve greatness and not remain a run of the mill leader who is more preoccupied with the interests of his kind than those of the common people.
About 50 years ago, in August 1963, Martin Luther King Jr electrified America with his momentous “I Have a Dream” speech, dramatically delivered from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.The key message in the speech is that all people are created equal and that, although not the case in America at the time, King felt this truth must be the basis for American racial relations in the future. And that was his dream, one that has more or less come true in America, if not elsewhere.But instead of dwelling on a universal value, Xi’s main focus seems to be on strengthening the party’s absolute claim to power, according to the Economist commentary. Xi has made it clear that he believes the Soviet Union collapsed because the Communist Party there strayed from ideological orthodoxy and rigid discipline.“The Chinese dream,” Xi was quoted as saying, “is an ideal. Communists should have a higher ideal, and that is communism.”
It appears that Xi also sets his sights on greatness, though greatness of a different kind than that of Martin Luther King Jr, because unlike King, Xi is a communist.If so, we must then ask what steps he is prepared to take toward achieving some of the communist ideals, such as “from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs” and proletarian dictatorship, instead of dictatorship by the rich and powerful, now that the party is fast becoming the Bourgeois, if not Capitalist, Party of China.Mr Xi, what say you begin by bringing into the political bureau some of the “have-nots?”
TheWorld Economic Forum meeting ,HostingSEA GamesandLeading ASEAN in 2014
TheWorld Economic Forum meeting in East Asia Between the date xxLocated in yangoon Myanmar This meeting isn’t just about investments but it is to show the world that ASEAN is opening its market and investors are all welcomed to participate.
Opening their countries in the year 2011 is a big step towards the future for Myanmar. Myanmar is entering is starting to build and construct its country into something better from the pass.
Starting from the election in November ปี2010 ,Releasing Ong San Suji from house arrest in the 13th ofNovember 2010Next secretary of state Hilary clinton’s visit to Myanmar ont the 1st of Dec 2011and British Prime Minister David Cameron on the 13 April 2012 .
Cameron is the first British prime minister to visit the country in more than 60 years, and the president of the united states of america’s visit on the 19 Nov 2012 All these images are images of the pass Myanmar was quickly able to develop into a better country to meet the ongoing world market.
And as of now Myanmar will turn into a fast developing country a start is hosting the World Economic Forum in East Asia on the 5-7June 2556and hosting the 27th SEA games on the 11-13 of Dec 2013 Naypyidaw, Yangon, and Mandalay. It will be Myanmar’s third times to hold SEA Games after waiting for 44 years
As Myanmar continues preparations to assume the role of chair of ASEAN for the first time in 2014 And will start a new election in the following year.
Previously, the Foreign investment in Myanmar was almost five times higher in the last fiscal year than the previous year, figures published on Monday showed, and a senior investment official said much of it went into garment manufacturing.
“Local and foreign investment in Myanmar increased by five times in 2012/13,” official newspapers reported President Thein Sein saying in a speech in Mandalay on Sunday.
“Over $1.419 billion foreign direct investment was made for 94 enterprises while local investors made 1.1 trillion kyat (US $1.3 billion) for 65 enterprises, creating a total of 82,792 job opportunities,” he said.
A senior official from the Myanmar Investment Commission told Reuters Burma had attracted about $300 million in foreign direct investment (FDI) for 11 enterprises in the previous fiscal year starting in April 2011.
“The significance of last year’s FDI was 78 out of 94 proposed enterprises were in the labor-intensive manufacturing sector, mostly garment factories,” he said, asking not to be named since he was not authorized to talk to the media.
Most of the investment in fiscal 2012/13 came from China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.
“And the realization rate of proposed enterprises was unprecedentedly high,” he said, noting that since 1988 some $42.31 billion had been pledged for 563 enterprises but only $32.28 billion had actually been invested.
The outlook is bright, especially after the easing of trade and investment sanctions imposed by Western countries on the military regime that ran Myanmar until March 2011.
“The EU is planning to grant Myanmar GSP status very soon and now more and more potential foreign investors are coming to us from all parts of the world,” the investment official said, referring to the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) that offers trade advantages to poorer countries.
The investment climate has also been clarified by a new foreign investment law passed in November 2012.
China’s new leader has been quick to consolidate his power. What does he now want for his country?
THESE have been heady days for Chen Sisi, star of a song-and-dance group run by China’s nuclear-missile corps. For weeks her ballad “Chinese dream” has been topping the folk-song charts. She has performed it on state television against video backdrops of bullet trains, jets taking off from China’s newly launched aircraft-carrier and bucolic scenery. More than 1.1m fans follow her microblog, where she tweets about the Chinese dream.
Ms Chen is playing her part in a barrage of dream-themed propaganda unleashed by the Communist Party. Schools have been organising Chinese-dream speaking competitions. Some have put up “dream walls” on which students can stick notes describing their visions of the future. Party officials have selected model dreamers to tour workplaces and inspire others with their achievements. Academics are being encouraged to offer “Chinese dream” research proposals. Newspapers refer to it more and more (see chart). In December state media and government researchers, purportedly on the basis of studies of its usage, declared “dream” the Chinese character of the year for 2012.
It was, however, one very specific usage just before that December publication which set the country dreaming. On November 29th, two weeks after his appointment as the party’s general secretary and military commander-in-chief, Xi Jinping visited the grandiose National Museum next to Tiananmen Square. Flanked by six dour-looking, dark-clad colleagues from the Politburo’s standing committee, Mr Xi told a gaggle of press and museum workers that the “greatest Chinese dream” was the “great revival of the Chinese nation”.
Soft places
The adoption of a personal slogan—one that conveys a sense of beyond-normal wisdom and vision in a short, memorable and perhaps somewhat opaque phrase—has been a rite of passage for all Chinese leaders since Mao Zedong. Mr Xi’s “Chinese dream” slogan is exceptional, though. Its demotic air can be read as a dig at the stodgy catchphrases of his predecessors: the “scientific-development outlook” beloved of Hu Jintao; the even more arcane “Three Represents” cherished by Mr Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin. It makes no allusion to ideology or party policy. It chimes, quite possibly deliberately, with a foreign notion—the American dream. But it is calculated in its opacity. Previous slogans, such as Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up”, could be broadly understood in terms of policy. The dream seems designed to inspire rather than inform.
The symbolism of the setting in which Mr Xi first gave voice to his slogan was more telling than the words that accompanied it. The National Museum’s “Road to Revival” exhibit is a propaganda romp through China’s history since the mid-19th century. Its aim is to show China’s suffering at the hands of colonial powers in the “century of humiliation” and its eventual glorious recovery under party rule. (The millions of deaths from starvation and political strife under Mao, and the bloody crushing of anti-government unrest under Deng, go unremarked.) Mr Xi’s words implied that the Chinese dream, in contrast to its American namesake, was about something more than middle-class material comfort. His backdrop made it clear that he was flexing his muscles as a nationalist and as a party believer.
Since that debut in November Mr Xi has returned to the idea of the dream on many occasions. In March the Chinese dream was the main subject of his acceptance speech to the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament, on being appointed state president. In early April, at an annual forum attended by foreign political and business leaders on the tropical island of Hainan, Mr Xi said the Chinese dream would be fulfilled by the middle of the century. On the following day the party’s propaganda chief, Liu Yunshan, ordered that the concept of the Chinese dream be written into school textbooks to make sure that it “enters students’ brains”.
Mr Xi’s repetition of the slogan, as if rallying demoralised troops, hints at the party’s sense that for all its stellar economic achievements, it is still struggling to win public affection. He has been trying to address this by talking tough on corruption (“fighting tigers and flies at the same time”) and waging war on government extravagance (only “four dishes and a soup”). To this end he has cultivated a man-of-the-people style; many believed a report in a pro-Communist Hong Kong newspaper that he had taken a ride in a Beijing taxi, until state media denied it. The dream rhetoric fits with that image.
It is also distinctively Mr Xi’s. The term had been used in the titles of a couple of Chinese books in recent years. It had also been used at times in foreign commentary on China’s rise. But it was not in common use before Mr Xi’s trip to the museum.
Tales in the sand
Where did the slogan come from? Quite possibly the New York Times. Last October, in the run up to Mr Xi’s ascension, the Times ran a column by Thomas Friedman entitled “China Needs Its Own Dream”. Mr Friedman said that if Mr Xi’s dream for China’s emerging middle-class was just like the American dream (“a big car, a big house and Big Macs for all”) then “another planet” would be needed. Instead he urged Mr Xi to come up with “a new Chinese dream that marries people’s expectations of prosperity with a more sustainable China.” China’s biggest-circulation newspaper, Reference News, ran a translation.
According to Xinhua, a government news agency, the Chinese dream “suddenly became a hot topic among commentators at home and abroad”. When Mr Xi began to use the phrase,Globe, a magazine published by Xinhua, called Mr Xi’s Chinese-dream idea “the best response to Friedman”. Zhang Ming of Renmin University says Mr Xi may have deliberately used the term as a way of improving dialogue with America, where it would be readily understood. Mr Xi had seen the American dream up close, having spent a couple of weeks in 1985 with a rural family in Iowa. (He revisited them during a trip to America last year as leader-in-waiting.)
That does not mean his musings on the dream have been designed to meet Mr Friedman’s appeal for more sustainable growth. Rhetorically at least, such a need was central to party policy long before the latest slogan. Mr Hu’s “scientific-development outlook” was all about being greener, even if his ten years in power saw little abatement of relentless environmental damage. Through protests and media commentary the public is pressing Mr Xi to clean up more vigorously. But he has been shy of making commitments. On November 15th, in his first speech after taking over as general secretary, Mr Xi mentioned “a better environment” toward the end of a list of what he said were the public’s wishes. Better education and more stable jobs were at the top.
If Mr Xi’s Chinese dream is not Mr Friedman’s, what is it? So far that is being left deliberately vague. The unwritten rules of succession politics in China require Mr Xi to keep his policy preferences close to his chest at the beginning of his term in office, and to stick to the guidelines laid down by his predecessors. He is all but obliged to work towards the targets of the five-year economic plan that was adopted under Mr Hu in 2011 (which is strong on the need for more environmentally friendly growth). He has to stick to the party’s longer-term plans as well: the attainment of a “moderately well-off society” by the time of the party’s 100th birthday in 2021 (one year before Mr Xi would have to retire); the creation of a “rich, strong, democratic, civilised and harmonious socialist modern country” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist nation. (The meaning of these words has never been made clear, but officials are explicit that “democratic” does not involve multi-party politics.) If precedent is any guide, Mr Xi would not begin to start any serious tinkering with policy until a meeting of the party’s central committee in the autumn, a year after his assumption of power.
The vagueness of the “Chinese dream” slogan allows Mr Xi to embrace these inherited aims while hinting that, under his rule, change is possible. But the lack of specificity also carries risks. It provides a space in which the Chinese can think of their own dreams—which may not coincide with Mr Xi’s. Since November the term has not merely been promulgated. It has been discussed and even argued about across the political spectrum, both in articles published by the official media and in outpourings online. In effect, the public is defining the dream by itself.
Nationalists see their own dreams validated. To them the tall and portly Mr Xi represents a new vigour in Chinese politics after Mr Hu’s studied greyness. His talk of China’s revival plays to their sense that China has a rightful place at the top of the global pecking-order.
In 1820, as some historians reckon and Chinese commentators like to point out, China’s GDP was one-third of the world total. Then the reversals of the century of humiliation brought it low. By the 1960s, China’s GDP had dropped to just 4% of the world total. Now it has recovered to about one-sixth of the world’s GDP—and at least 90% of America’s—in purchasing-power parity terms, according to the Conference Board, a business research organisation. Nationalists eagerly await the day when China’s economy becomes once more the biggest in the world by any measure, a day which many observers expect to dawn while Mr Xi is still leader.
Mr Xi appears anxious to secure the support of nationalists, particularly within the armed forces, and dream-talk helps. In December, during an inspection tour of the navy in southern China, Mr Xi spoke of a “strong-army dream” and said that resolutely obeying the party’s orders was the “spirit of a strong army”—a swipe at liberals who argue that the army should be removed from the party’s direct control. In March the army issued a circular to troops saying that the “strong-nation dream of a great revival of the Chinese people” was in effect a “strong-army dream”.
Sound and fury
Nationalist hawks, especially military ones, are a constituency Mr Xi cannot ignore. In recent years their views have been expressed far more openly thanks to an easing of controls on publishing by officers. Shortly after Mr Xi first spoke of the Chinese dream in November, the publishers of a 2010 book called “China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era” rushed to bring out a new edition. The official media, happy to discuss Mr Friedman’s prior use of the dream notion, have made no suggestion that the book has any connection to Mr Xi’s slogan. But it is the most prominently displayed work on the dream theme in a large state-owned bookshop near Tiananmen Square. The book’s author, Liu Mingfu, a senior colonel, argues that China should regain its position as the most powerful nation in the world, a position it had held for a thousand years before its humiliation.
Mr Xi prefers to avoid any public talk of surpassing American power. During a trip to Russia in March (his first foreign excursion as president) he said fulfilment of the Chinese dream would benefit all countries. But as Henry Kissinger suggests in his 2011 book “On China”, Mr Liu’s views reflect “at least some portion of China’s institutional structure”. As tensions roil with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines over maritime territorial claims, the role of these shadowy figures among China’s security policymakers is a topic of much speculation. Mr Xi has not been helping to clear the air (see Banyan).
China’s chest-thumping has not been restricted to its neighbours. While contriving not to mention America by name, an April white paper on defence carped about its security “pivot” towards Asia making the situation in the region “tenser”. The state-controlled media went further. China Daily, a Beijing newspaper, quoted “military experts” as saying that the Chinese government had no problem with America seeking involvement in the region’s prosperity. But China was concerned, it said, that America’s renewed focus on its alliances in Asia “might be aimed at China and disturb the ‘Chinese dream’ of national rejuvenation.”The white paper was released just after John Kerry, America’s secretary of state, visited Beijing in April. The trip was aimed at reassuring China of America’s commitment to good relations following the re-election of Barack Obama and the handover to Mr Xi. “You’ve all heard of the American dream,” Mr Kerry said in Tokyo after leaving Beijing. “Now Beijing’s new leader has introduced what he calls a ‘China dream’.” Mr Kerry tried to reconcile the two by proposing that America, China and other countries work towards a “Pacific dream” of co-operation on issues ranging from job growth and climate change to pandemic disease and proliferation.
But this suggestion did little to abate the two countries’ mutual wariness. The idea of a Pacific dream, said one Chinese commentator, was an attempt to spread the American dream into every corner of Asia in order to ensure that “America’s dominance of this region will never pass into another’s hands”. To Chinese nationalists that is more like a nightmare.
Although Mr Xi doubtless feels a need to play towards such sentiments, he probably shares his predecessor’s wariness towards at least some of their proponents. China’s modern history offers many examples of anti-government movements cloaked in nationalist garb. And his dream-talk is clearly also intended for a wider audience. While his speech in November on the Chinese dream appealed to the nationalist cause, by March his language had turned softer. “In the end the Chinese dream is the people’s dream,” he said at the National People’s Congress, omitting any reference to the century of humiliation. (Around this time the English-language media, which initially went back and forth, plumped for “Chinese dream” over “China dream” as a translation, thus subtly emphasising the people over the nation.) An article published by Caixin Media, a Beijing news portal, said there was “nothing short of a competition between the American dream and the Chinese dream”. But it said China needed to address this by boosting its “moral appeal to others”. Doveish voices abound in China too.
Playing house
By tangentially evoking the American dream with his language, Mr Xi may be trying to reassure the country’s new middle-class, a constituency that could present a powerful challenge to party rule if it becomes seriously disaffected. Officials predict that economic growth will be slower under Mr Xi than it was under Mr Hu. Mr Xi is suggesting that this will not mean a tightening of middle-class belts.
Li Chunling, a specialist in middle-class studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, says that the dream of China’s wealthier middle-class members is to live like their American counterparts (and to see them in action: hence a surging enthusiasm for travel abroad). Mr Xi would not want to let them down. But Ms Li suggests this will be hard. Among the better-off, worries about China’s development in the coming years, including risks related to pollution and social unrest, are prompting growing numbers to emigrate, she says.
Mr Xi will face difficulty selling the idea that China can be “rich and strong” while remaining a one-party state. According to Zhang Qianfan, a liberal legal scholar at Peking University, “more than three-quarters [of the Chinese] would associate the Chinese dream with a dream of constitutionalism”. “Constitutionalism” is the belief that the constitution—which, except in its preamble, does not mention any role for the party itself—should have an authority that overrides the whims of the party. In January a state-controlled newspaper,Southern Weekend, tried to publish a new-year message entitled “The Chinese dream: a dream of constitutionalism”. Only with a division of powers, said one passage, could China become a “free and strong country”. The article was replaced with a censored version—entitled “The Chinese dream is nearer to us than ever before”—stripped of the original’s comments on the importance of the constitution. Several journalists went on strike in protest.
Mr Xi has spoken of the importance of the constitution, but he has not mentioned “constitutionalism”—and he has avoided the use of the word “free” when talking about the dream. In unpublished remarks made during his trip to southern China in December, and later leaked by a journalist, Mr Xi said: “The Chinese dream is an ideal. Communists should have a higher ideal, and that is communism.” He said the reason for the Soviet Union’s collapse was its straying from ideological orthodoxy. In other words, he would be no Gorbachev.
But Mr Xi’s talk of a dream will always run the risk of sharpening appetites for change. Mr Zhang says that 150 people, many of them prominent scholars, have signed a petition for full implementation of the constitution that he launched last December. In late March People’s Forum, a website run by the People’s Daily, the party’s main mouthpiece, tried to gauge public support for Mr Xi’s dream by carrying out an online survey. The “Chinese dream” slogan, it said in an introduction, had “reignited hopes for the great revival of the Chinese nation”. The page was quickly deleted after around 80% of more than 3,000 respondents replied “no” to questions such as whether they supported one-party rule and believed in socialism.
According to Ms Chen’s rather syrupy song, the Chinese dream is “A dream of a strong nation…a dream of a wealthy people”. Mr Xi seems of the same opinion—and has, as yet, been little more specific. In the absence of substance, Mr Xi’s talk of a dream is creating space for a lively debate over where China should be heading. For the time being it may suit Mr Xi to keep the course he will be following unclear. But demands for clarity can only grow louder.
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