Indonesia Business Roundup May 2013 : Exports and Tourists
YEAR-ON-YEAR EXPORTS DOWN IN MAY
Exports declined by 4.49 percent to US$16.07 billion in May 2013 based on a year-on-year basis, the National Statistics Agency (BPS) revealed on Monday.
“The decline was triggered by the decreasing oil and gas exports, which stood at 22.98 percent, while non-oil and non-gas exports only increased by 0.77 percent,” BPS Head Suryamin said as quoted by Antara.
The exports in May, however, still managed to climb up by 8.9 percent based on a monthly basis, according to Suryamin.
Most exports in May were bound for China with $1.72 billion, followed by Japan and India with $1.44 billion and $1.32 billion respectively.
The National Statistics Agency (BPS) said the foreign tourist visit rate increased by 7.65 percent to 700,700 in May compared to the same period last year.
Based on a monthly basis, the rate climbed by 8.45 percent.
Cumulatively this year, the number of foreign tourist visits stood at 3.36 million or up by 5.79 percent from the same period last year, the BPS said in its official release.
Room occupancy rate in 23 provinces also increased by 0.15 points to 53.60 in May 2013 compared to the same period last year.
A WALK AROUND battered, ramshackle Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city and former capital, quickly makes it clear how far the country has fallen behind the rest of Asia over the past half-century. In large part the place is but a ghostly reminder of former glories. Under British colonial rule, before independence in 1948, Rangoon (as it was then) was a thriving, cosmopolitan entrepot, the capital of Burma, one of the region’s wealthiest countries. All that came to an abrupt end in 1962 after a junta of army officers, led by the brutal General Ne Win, seized power and launched the country on the quasi-Marxist “Burmese Way to Socialism”. Private foreign-owned businesses were nationalised, prompting the exodus of hundreds of thousands of people, many of Indian origin. The country’s tenuous attachment to democracy was broken. Myanmar, as Burma was later renamed by its ruling generals, retreated into itself. Comprehensive Western sanctions hit home from the mid-1990s onwards, only slightly alleviated by an injection of Asian money.
Yangon, with its old cars and bookshops selling textbooks from the 1950s, attests to this seclusion. The colonial-era banks, law courts and department stores, once as imposing as any in Kolkata or Shanghai, have all but crumbled away. Except for the magnificent Shwedagon Pagoda, lovingly regilded to welcome the crowds of pilgrims and tourists, most of the city seems to have remained untouched for decades. Even youthful rebellion is stuck in a time-warp. Boys are still gamely attempting to flout authority by dressing up as punk-rockers.
But now the country has seen another about-turn, almost as abrupt as that in 1962. Over the past two years dramatic reforms introduced by a new president, Thein Sein, prompted by the country’s increasingly desperate economic straits, have started a rapid transition from secretive isolation to an open democracy of sorts. The mere fact of such a change taking place has surprised the world; its speed and breadth have caused widespread bewilderment.
Even in careworn Yangon the signs are everywhere. The pavements are cluttered with traders selling an array of newspapers, newly licensed and privately owned, carrying pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD). Less than two years ago the image of the defiant Nobel peace-prize laureate was banned; under a strict censorship system her name could not even be mentioned in the press. Now all censorship before publication has been lifted; any paper, such as the NLD’s own newspaperD Wave, can apply to publish daily; and Miss Suu Kyi’s photo festoons T-shirts, mugs and biros for sale on almost every street corner. People are still excited about being able to speak freely, even about politics, without constantly having to look over their shoulders. Some of those interviewed for this special report had never before talked to a foreigner, let alone a foreign journalist.
With greater political freedom has come economic change. Almost all Western sanctions against the country have been lifted, and the country is swiftly reconnecting with the international financial system. Visitors no longer have to wander around with so many wads of dirty old kyat, the local currency, in their pockets: the first international ATM in Yangon has recently started disgorging fresh banknotes. Some outlets are now accepting credit cards. Real Western brands, rather than pirated versions, are about to appear in a few shops. An influx of relatively wealthy foreigners and returned natives will need new offices and apartments. Prime parts of Yangon are rapidly being flattened to cater for the expected demand.
Myanmar’s transformation is the most significant event to have taken place in South-East Asia in the past decade, and this special report will argue that it will have important consequences for the rest of Asia as well. In the space of just a few years almost every aspect of life has been touched by the reform programme. Not only was Miss Suu Kyi released from house arrest in November 2010, but the vast majority of the country’s thousands of political prisoners have been freed. The NLD, harassed for decades and then declared illegal for refusing to participate in rigged elections in 2010, is legitimate once more. In April 2012 it won 43 out of 44 seats it contested in by-elections, the country’s first free and fair polls since the 1950s: its MPs, led by Miss Suu Kyi, now sit in parliament.
China’s new leader has been quick to consolidate his power. What does he now want for his country?
THESE have been heady days for Chen Sisi, star of a song-and-dance group run by China’s nuclear-missile corps. For weeks her ballad “Chinese dream” has been topping the folk-song charts. She has performed it on state television against video backdrops of bullet trains, jets taking off from China’s newly launched aircraft-carrier and bucolic scenery. More than 1.1m fans follow her microblog, where she tweets about the Chinese dream.
Ms Chen is playing her part in a barrage of dream-themed propaganda unleashed by the Communist Party. Schools have been organising Chinese-dream speaking competitions. Some have put up “dream walls” on which students can stick notes describing their visions of the future. Party officials have selected model dreamers to tour workplaces and inspire others with their achievements. Academics are being encouraged to offer “Chinese dream” research proposals. Newspapers refer to it more and more (see chart). In December state media and government researchers, purportedly on the basis of studies of its usage, declared “dream” the Chinese character of the year for 2012.
It was, however, one very specific usage just before that December publication which set the country dreaming. On November 29th, two weeks after his appointment as the party’s general secretary and military commander-in-chief, Xi Jinping visited the grandiose National Museum next to Tiananmen Square. Flanked by six dour-looking, dark-clad colleagues from the Politburo’s standing committee, Mr Xi told a gaggle of press and museum workers that the “greatest Chinese dream” was the “great revival of the Chinese nation”.
Soft places
The adoption of a personal slogan—one that conveys a sense of beyond-normal wisdom and vision in a short, memorable and perhaps somewhat opaque phrase—has been a rite of passage for all Chinese leaders since Mao Zedong. Mr Xi’s “Chinese dream” slogan is exceptional, though. Its demotic air can be read as a dig at the stodgy catchphrases of his predecessors: the “scientific-development outlook” beloved of Hu Jintao; the even more arcane “Three Represents” cherished by Mr Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin. It makes no allusion to ideology or party policy. It chimes, quite possibly deliberately, with a foreign notion—the American dream. But it is calculated in its opacity. Previous slogans, such as Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up”, could be broadly understood in terms of policy. The dream seems designed to inspire rather than inform.
The symbolism of the setting in which Mr Xi first gave voice to his slogan was more telling than the words that accompanied it. The National Museum’s “Road to Revival” exhibit is a propaganda romp through China’s history since the mid-19th century. Its aim is to show China’s suffering at the hands of colonial powers in the “century of humiliation” and its eventual glorious recovery under party rule. (The millions of deaths from starvation and political strife under Mao, and the bloody crushing of anti-government unrest under Deng, go unremarked.) Mr Xi’s words implied that the Chinese dream, in contrast to its American namesake, was about something more than middle-class material comfort. His backdrop made it clear that he was flexing his muscles as a nationalist and as a party believer.
Since that debut in November Mr Xi has returned to the idea of the dream on many occasions. In March the Chinese dream was the main subject of his acceptance speech to the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament, on being appointed state president. In early April, at an annual forum attended by foreign political and business leaders on the tropical island of Hainan, Mr Xi said the Chinese dream would be fulfilled by the middle of the century. On the following day the party’s propaganda chief, Liu Yunshan, ordered that the concept of the Chinese dream be written into school textbooks to make sure that it “enters students’ brains”.
Mr Xi’s repetition of the slogan, as if rallying demoralised troops, hints at the party’s sense that for all its stellar economic achievements, it is still struggling to win public affection. He has been trying to address this by talking tough on corruption (“fighting tigers and flies at the same time”) and waging war on government extravagance (only “four dishes and a soup”). To this end he has cultivated a man-of-the-people style; many believed a report in a pro-Communist Hong Kong newspaper that he had taken a ride in a Beijing taxi, until state media denied it. The dream rhetoric fits with that image.
It is also distinctively Mr Xi’s. The term had been used in the titles of a couple of Chinese books in recent years. It had also been used at times in foreign commentary on China’s rise. But it was not in common use before Mr Xi’s trip to the museum.
Tales in the sand
Where did the slogan come from? Quite possibly the New York Times. Last October, in the run up to Mr Xi’s ascension, the Times ran a column by Thomas Friedman entitled “China Needs Its Own Dream”. Mr Friedman said that if Mr Xi’s dream for China’s emerging middle-class was just like the American dream (“a big car, a big house and Big Macs for all”) then “another planet” would be needed. Instead he urged Mr Xi to come up with “a new Chinese dream that marries people’s expectations of prosperity with a more sustainable China.” China’s biggest-circulation newspaper, Reference News, ran a translation.
According to Xinhua, a government news agency, the Chinese dream “suddenly became a hot topic among commentators at home and abroad”. When Mr Xi began to use the phrase,Globe, a magazine published by Xinhua, called Mr Xi’s Chinese-dream idea “the best response to Friedman”. Zhang Ming of Renmin University says Mr Xi may have deliberately used the term as a way of improving dialogue with America, where it would be readily understood. Mr Xi had seen the American dream up close, having spent a couple of weeks in 1985 with a rural family in Iowa. (He revisited them during a trip to America last year as leader-in-waiting.)
That does not mean his musings on the dream have been designed to meet Mr Friedman’s appeal for more sustainable growth. Rhetorically at least, such a need was central to party policy long before the latest slogan. Mr Hu’s “scientific-development outlook” was all about being greener, even if his ten years in power saw little abatement of relentless environmental damage. Through protests and media commentary the public is pressing Mr Xi to clean up more vigorously. But he has been shy of making commitments. On November 15th, in his first speech after taking over as general secretary, Mr Xi mentioned “a better environment” toward the end of a list of what he said were the public’s wishes. Better education and more stable jobs were at the top.
If Mr Xi’s Chinese dream is not Mr Friedman’s, what is it? So far that is being left deliberately vague. The unwritten rules of succession politics in China require Mr Xi to keep his policy preferences close to his chest at the beginning of his term in office, and to stick to the guidelines laid down by his predecessors. He is all but obliged to work towards the targets of the five-year economic plan that was adopted under Mr Hu in 2011 (which is strong on the need for more environmentally friendly growth). He has to stick to the party’s longer-term plans as well: the attainment of a “moderately well-off society” by the time of the party’s 100th birthday in 2021 (one year before Mr Xi would have to retire); the creation of a “rich, strong, democratic, civilised and harmonious socialist modern country” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist nation. (The meaning of these words has never been made clear, but officials are explicit that “democratic” does not involve multi-party politics.) If precedent is any guide, Mr Xi would not begin to start any serious tinkering with policy until a meeting of the party’s central committee in the autumn, a year after his assumption of power.
The vagueness of the “Chinese dream” slogan allows Mr Xi to embrace these inherited aims while hinting that, under his rule, change is possible. But the lack of specificity also carries risks. It provides a space in which the Chinese can think of their own dreams—which may not coincide with Mr Xi’s. Since November the term has not merely been promulgated. It has been discussed and even argued about across the political spectrum, both in articles published by the official media and in outpourings online. In effect, the public is defining the dream by itself.
Nationalists see their own dreams validated. To them the tall and portly Mr Xi represents a new vigour in Chinese politics after Mr Hu’s studied greyness. His talk of China’s revival plays to their sense that China has a rightful place at the top of the global pecking-order.
In 1820, as some historians reckon and Chinese commentators like to point out, China’s GDP was one-third of the world total. Then the reversals of the century of humiliation brought it low. By the 1960s, China’s GDP had dropped to just 4% of the world total. Now it has recovered to about one-sixth of the world’s GDP—and at least 90% of America’s—in purchasing-power parity terms, according to the Conference Board, a business research organisation. Nationalists eagerly await the day when China’s economy becomes once more the biggest in the world by any measure, a day which many observers expect to dawn while Mr Xi is still leader.
Mr Xi appears anxious to secure the support of nationalists, particularly within the armed forces, and dream-talk helps. In December, during an inspection tour of the navy in southern China, Mr Xi spoke of a “strong-army dream” and said that resolutely obeying the party’s orders was the “spirit of a strong army”—a swipe at liberals who argue that the army should be removed from the party’s direct control. In March the army issued a circular to troops saying that the “strong-nation dream of a great revival of the Chinese people” was in effect a “strong-army dream”.
Sound and fury
Nationalist hawks, especially military ones, are a constituency Mr Xi cannot ignore. In recent years their views have been expressed far more openly thanks to an easing of controls on publishing by officers. Shortly after Mr Xi first spoke of the Chinese dream in November, the publishers of a 2010 book called “China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era” rushed to bring out a new edition. The official media, happy to discuss Mr Friedman’s prior use of the dream notion, have made no suggestion that the book has any connection to Mr Xi’s slogan. But it is the most prominently displayed work on the dream theme in a large state-owned bookshop near Tiananmen Square. The book’s author, Liu Mingfu, a senior colonel, argues that China should regain its position as the most powerful nation in the world, a position it had held for a thousand years before its humiliation.
Mr Xi prefers to avoid any public talk of surpassing American power. During a trip to Russia in March (his first foreign excursion as president) he said fulfilment of the Chinese dream would benefit all countries. But as Henry Kissinger suggests in his 2011 book “On China”, Mr Liu’s views reflect “at least some portion of China’s institutional structure”. As tensions roil with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines over maritime territorial claims, the role of these shadowy figures among China’s security policymakers is a topic of much speculation. Mr Xi has not been helping to clear the air (see Banyan).
China’s chest-thumping has not been restricted to its neighbours. While contriving not to mention America by name, an April white paper on defence carped about its security “pivot” towards Asia making the situation in the region “tenser”. The state-controlled media went further. China Daily, a Beijing newspaper, quoted “military experts” as saying that the Chinese government had no problem with America seeking involvement in the region’s prosperity. But China was concerned, it said, that America’s renewed focus on its alliances in Asia “might be aimed at China and disturb the ‘Chinese dream’ of national rejuvenation.”The white paper was released just after John Kerry, America’s secretary of state, visited Beijing in April. The trip was aimed at reassuring China of America’s commitment to good relations following the re-election of Barack Obama and the handover to Mr Xi. “You’ve all heard of the American dream,” Mr Kerry said in Tokyo after leaving Beijing. “Now Beijing’s new leader has introduced what he calls a ‘China dream’.” Mr Kerry tried to reconcile the two by proposing that America, China and other countries work towards a “Pacific dream” of co-operation on issues ranging from job growth and climate change to pandemic disease and proliferation.
But this suggestion did little to abate the two countries’ mutual wariness. The idea of a Pacific dream, said one Chinese commentator, was an attempt to spread the American dream into every corner of Asia in order to ensure that “America’s dominance of this region will never pass into another’s hands”. To Chinese nationalists that is more like a nightmare.
Although Mr Xi doubtless feels a need to play towards such sentiments, he probably shares his predecessor’s wariness towards at least some of their proponents. China’s modern history offers many examples of anti-government movements cloaked in nationalist garb. And his dream-talk is clearly also intended for a wider audience. While his speech in November on the Chinese dream appealed to the nationalist cause, by March his language had turned softer. “In the end the Chinese dream is the people’s dream,” he said at the National People’s Congress, omitting any reference to the century of humiliation. (Around this time the English-language media, which initially went back and forth, plumped for “Chinese dream” over “China dream” as a translation, thus subtly emphasising the people over the nation.) An article published by Caixin Media, a Beijing news portal, said there was “nothing short of a competition between the American dream and the Chinese dream”. But it said China needed to address this by boosting its “moral appeal to others”. Doveish voices abound in China too.
Playing house
By tangentially evoking the American dream with his language, Mr Xi may be trying to reassure the country’s new middle-class, a constituency that could present a powerful challenge to party rule if it becomes seriously disaffected. Officials predict that economic growth will be slower under Mr Xi than it was under Mr Hu. Mr Xi is suggesting that this will not mean a tightening of middle-class belts.
Li Chunling, a specialist in middle-class studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, says that the dream of China’s wealthier middle-class members is to live like their American counterparts (and to see them in action: hence a surging enthusiasm for travel abroad). Mr Xi would not want to let them down. But Ms Li suggests this will be hard. Among the better-off, worries about China’s development in the coming years, including risks related to pollution and social unrest, are prompting growing numbers to emigrate, she says.
Mr Xi will face difficulty selling the idea that China can be “rich and strong” while remaining a one-party state. According to Zhang Qianfan, a liberal legal scholar at Peking University, “more than three-quarters [of the Chinese] would associate the Chinese dream with a dream of constitutionalism”. “Constitutionalism” is the belief that the constitution—which, except in its preamble, does not mention any role for the party itself—should have an authority that overrides the whims of the party. In January a state-controlled newspaper,Southern Weekend, tried to publish a new-year message entitled “The Chinese dream: a dream of constitutionalism”. Only with a division of powers, said one passage, could China become a “free and strong country”. The article was replaced with a censored version—entitled “The Chinese dream is nearer to us than ever before”—stripped of the original’s comments on the importance of the constitution. Several journalists went on strike in protest.
Mr Xi has spoken of the importance of the constitution, but he has not mentioned “constitutionalism”—and he has avoided the use of the word “free” when talking about the dream. In unpublished remarks made during his trip to southern China in December, and later leaked by a journalist, Mr Xi said: “The Chinese dream is an ideal. Communists should have a higher ideal, and that is communism.” He said the reason for the Soviet Union’s collapse was its straying from ideological orthodoxy. In other words, he would be no Gorbachev.
But Mr Xi’s talk of a dream will always run the risk of sharpening appetites for change. Mr Zhang says that 150 people, many of them prominent scholars, have signed a petition for full implementation of the constitution that he launched last December. In late March People’s Forum, a website run by the People’s Daily, the party’s main mouthpiece, tried to gauge public support for Mr Xi’s dream by carrying out an online survey. The “Chinese dream” slogan, it said in an introduction, had “reignited hopes for the great revival of the Chinese nation”. The page was quickly deleted after around 80% of more than 3,000 respondents replied “no” to questions such as whether they supported one-party rule and believed in socialism.
According to Ms Chen’s rather syrupy song, the Chinese dream is “A dream of a strong nation…a dream of a wealthy people”. Mr Xi seems of the same opinion—and has, as yet, been little more specific. In the absence of substance, Mr Xi’s talk of a dream is creating space for a lively debate over where China should be heading. For the time being it may suit Mr Xi to keep the course he will be following unclear. But demands for clarity can only grow louder.
9.Multiple skill and multiple language abilities will needed, 5 years from now in the year 2018.
“Workers needs to have Multiple skill and multiple language abilities” Due to the opening of AEC, the combine forces of industrial, business, marketing, and investment, will make it hard to compete in AEC. Due to the pressure from vast amounts of competitors, and customers’ need which are different and increasing every day. Both from new customers who likes brand names, customers with different taste, and old customers who needs new and unique products. Customers expects that companies are able to make what they need and what they want thus pressuring workers in the company, because of this workers needs to have multiple skills and the knowledge of multiple language. So that they can use these skills to change and improve their companies in order to compete in the new world.
10. Green Economy and Creative Economy, 5 years from now in the year 2018.
“Green Economy and Creative Economy will be the last Business Solutions” In the direction of improving and collaborations between different countries, and the incoming changes of the world in terms of the usage of economical and natural resources. Making the preservation of the environment being an important factor in preserving the world and preserving international relationship between foreign countries. Resulting in changes to the industry, business, investments, and organizations, to make changes in order to preserve the environment. Thus many organizations will face many difficulties due to this change. It is up to the organization to change and improve their products to help preserve the environment which will satisfy customer needs and help organizations to keep up with the market of the changing world.
11. Complex communications and Social Networks, 5 years from now in the year 2018.
“Complex communications and Social Networks will be the main communication in society” in the near future people with use Social Medias to connect and share ideas all over the world. Starting from a little bit to more and more so until it becomes big enough and become the main means of connection for the world. Thus creating creative products via Social networks which are fast growing will determine the survival of many organizations.If organizations are able to adapt and change their system to meet this requirement fast enough that organization can protect their products. Organizations that cannot do so will face difficulties.
12. Lifelong & multi-channel learning, 5 years from now in the year 2018.
“Lifelong & multi-channel learning will be the ways people live“ The future society will be a society that has a lot of elderly people, due to the improvement in science the average lifespan of human will be higher thus there will be a larger amount of elder people and in the end there will be more elderly people than young people. The improvement in technology at an alarming rate will force people to learn and study through their whole entire life cycle. This is done to keep up with the fast changing society. In order to live and adapt to the fast changing technology, these changes an example for improvement in the future society.
5. Border cities will become to the important cities .5 years from now in the year 2018
“Border cities will grow and become important cities”. These cities will go through rapid growth, turning into big and important cities. In many areas, industries will turn into “Green industrial estates” and eventually turn into commerce areas. At the same time these areas will grow into living areas for medium and high class people who have a good amount of wealth. The mentioned demographic prefers to live in large areas accessible to the high speed train (roughly 30 minutes from the railway station). Areas within close proximity to the railway station will turn into living areas where people are able to commune on a daily basis to city centers and capitals. Bangkok will be more crowded, various environmental problems will arise. Many companies will attempt to move out of Bangkok and its Metropolitan.
6. ASEAN Community will opened up for International companies.5 years from now in the year 2018.
“Many new foreign companies will gets its way into Thailand and ASEAN community” International markets will grow in Thailand where many foreign companies will find its way into Thailand . Services will be improved via “Know How techniques.” Thailand and its neighboring countries will have to take a defensive approach to this. Many companies will face difficulties during this time. The abilities of many managers will be tested. They will have to face confusion and numerous difficulties such as competitors, changing/adapting strategies to survive in these markets, etc. We’re looking at 3 years after AEC; Thailand will have to face countries such as China, Japan, and Korea who will try to dominate ASEAN ’s market.
7. In ASEAN,Public services for All. 5 years from now in the year 2018.
“Public services will have to be suitable for all citizens in ASEAN” Thus the commerce, business, investments, etc of ASEAN will grow rapidly. Services will have to meet the requirements for all ASEAN citizens. English will have to be used in order to do business together, thus companies will have to improve their worker’s language efficiency. A good example of a country who is ready for ASEAN is Singapore, which uses four languages as its official language, English, Mandarin, Malay, and Timil.
8.New International city will be emerging in ASEAN.5 years from now in the year 2018.
“Capital cities will turn into international cities” Important cities of each country in ASEAN cities such as capital cities or important cities or cities in the economic corridor will develop in the same way that is developing into international cities. The amount of ASEAN citizens in these countries would be much more compared to its surrounding countries. Doing business, commerce, trading in these countries would be much more international than other countries. Communications, transportation, investments etc, will drive these cities towards its goals of becoming an international city. Eventually the demand for an international life will turn these cities to turn into international cities.
1. Finding good jobs in Thailand will be much harder : 5 years from now in the year 2018
“Finding good jobs in Thailand will be much harder” Thailand’s newly graduates will have to compete with graduates from surrounding countries to get a job in companies. Getting jobs in companies such as International companies, national companies, especially companies that has many branches in foreign countries will be much harder. The remaining jobs are those that are in medium or small sized companies thus they won’t last very long. Simply speaking First class job will be harder to get and only Second Class jobs will be available, education degrees of some education centers may not be accepted, while international or specific degrees will be much more important.
2. Finding jobs in foreign countries and the ASEAN community : 5 years from now in the year 2018
“Finding jobs in foreign countries and the ASEAN community” will be much more frequent in that it becomes a common thing. A “brain distribution” will occur in many different careers. International companies in countries neighboring Thailand will be the main attraction. Low-cost airplane flights and high speed trains will increase the rate of growth to this so call “brain distribution” in a huge way.
3. SMES will be in the trouble moving : 5 years from now in the year 2018
“Both medium and small enterprises will be in the trouble moving” will face many difficulties in terms of competition. With the improvement in transportation the costs of logistics are cheaper signaling the coming of “good and cheap products”which replaces “bad and expensive products”. Thus industries that are in these businesses will have to face competitors from foreign countries especially medium and small enterprises which do not use complex technology. These enterprises will have trouble competing. Good examples are cheap products from China.
4. Service Industries will be in the challenging times : 5 years from now in the year 2018
“Service Industry challenges in the AEC environmental” will have to make big changes to their business plans due to the many different customer groups. Services will have to change to meet the many different kinds of customers. The competition will be tough due to new business from neighboring countries emerging into the market, thus keeping a constant position in the market industry will be much harder than before.
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